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T

he purpose of this paper is to show that Jennifer Lackey's “Statement View” (SV) of testimony does not provide as strong a framework for testimony as a source of
knowledge as the “Transmission View” (TV) of testimony. First, I will describe her arguments and counterexamples
against TV; then I will discuss how they do not convincingly
show that TV is false if TV is modified slightly. Second, I will explain SV and show that SV cannot be construed in a nonreductive way; doing so would preclude its ability to yield belief
or knowledge through means that are uniquely testimonial.
Third, I will entertain a possible objection to the modified TV
(henceforth TV*) which states that TV* may be reductionist.
Fourth, I will play into the favor of SV* (which is a modified version of SV) and assume that TV* is also reductive, and then show
that TV* is still preferable to SV*.
In her essay “Testimony,” Lackey presents several clear explanations of various views in the current and past literature on
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the epistemology of testimony. She first sets aside cases where
one would gain knowledge or belief from somebody's testimony
without said knowledge or belief being based on testimony.1
What she focuses on are cases where a hearer “forms a belief on
the basis of the content of a speaker's testimony.”2 She then goes
into a discussion about non-reductive3 and reductive4 accounts
of testimony. She rightfully rejects a view that is exclusively nonreductive, as that would result in a view that sanctions a high
degree of gullibility for any agent that follows it. She also rejects
both global and local reductionist views. I agree with her arguments against the former, but not the latter. I will go into greater
detail concerning her views on reductionism (both global and
local) and non-reductionism later, as they are pertinent to my
thesis. Lackey then discusses and rejects interpersonal views of
testimony (which are not in the scope of this paper), and then
begins her arguments against TV, which I will discuss next.
Testimony and Transmission
TV states that testimonial exchange involves a speaker's
knowledge being transmitted to a hearer.5 She then formulates
this general thesis by putting it in terms of necessary (TVN) and
sufficient (TVS) conditions:
TVN: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that p
is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testimony that p only if A's belief that p is warranted
(justified, known).6
TVS: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if (1) A's belief
that p is warranted (justified, known), (2) B comes to believe that p on the basis of the content of A's testimony
that p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing
that p, then B's belief that p is warranted (justified,
known).
After laying out these conditions, Lackey starts to argue against
them by using counterexamples. She first attempts to disprove
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TVN using two of them. The first involves “speakers who fail to
believe, and hence know, a proposition to which they are testifying but nevertheless reliably convey the information in question
through their testimony.”7 Her example, which I will call
“creationist teacher,” goes like this:
Creationist Teacher: Suppose that a devout creationist
who does not believe in the truth of evolutionary theory
nonetheless researches the topic extensively and on this
basis constructs extremely reliable lecture notes from
which she teaches her students (her motivation for this
could be the demands of the school’s curriculum).8
Because the teacher does not believe the theory of evolution, she
does not know it, since knowledge entails belief. Lackey argues
that her students still gain knowledge from her reliable testimony, despite the fact that she lacks belief. Thus, TVN is false as
there is no knowledge or belief to transfer. Her next example
against TVN “involves speakers who have an undefeated defeater for believing a proposition to which they are testifying, but
nevertheless reliably convey such a proposition through their
testimony without transmitting the defeater in question to their
hearers.”9 Lackey's example for this is what I will call “unreliable
seer,” which goes like this:
Unreliable Seer: Suppose that a speaker in fact possesses
her normal visual powers, but she is the subject of a neurosurgeon's experiments, and the surgeon falsely tells her
that implantations are causing malfunction in her visual
cortex. While she is persuaded that her present visual appearances are entirely unreliable, and thereby possesses a
doxastic defeater for the corresponding beliefs, she continues to place credence in her visual appearances. On the
basis of her visual experience (which is, unbeknownst to
her, reliable) she forms the true belief that there is a badger in a nearby field and then later reports this to her
friend without communicating the surgeon's testimony to
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him (and thus not communicating her defeater). So the
content of her experience is reliably conveyed to the hearer, without her doxastic defeater, thereby imparting
knowledge or belief she doesn't have herself.10
This is another instance of a hearer gaining a belief or knowledge
from a speaker who had neither, thus showing that TVN is false.
I do not believe that these examples are convincing counterexamples to TVN. In “creationist teacher,” for example, Lackey attacks
a very narrow conception of TVN. She correctly states that the
teacher does not know/believe, but still manages to give
knowledge/belief to her students. The issue, according to Lackey, is that the teacher is not the source of this knowledge/belief
and thus knowledge/belief is generated. Lackey does not consider the possibility that the teacher could actually be connecting
her students to somebody else who knows/believes the theory of
evolution (namely the person whose work she studied and based
her reliable lecture notes on). If this is considered, then it seems
plausible that knowledge/belief was passed to the children
through a chain of testimony.11
However, one may object and think that knowledge/belief is
lost when it reaches the teacher, as a “gap” in the testimonial
chain is created. Even if knowledge/belief is not transmitted, it
seems extremely plausible that warrant can be transmitted
(which is needed to properly believe the statement that the theory of evolution is true). Just because the teacher did not achieve
doxastic justification does not mean she was not propositionally
justified. Passing on this propositional justification transmits the
warrant necessary for the teacher's students to know/believe
based on testimony, despite the fact that the teacher does not
know/believe. To illustrate this, take the following example:
Aunt Ruth: Suppose that Billy is working on his logic
homework while his parents are entertaining some family. It is still the early evening, so the only people who
have shown up are his Aunt Ruth (who happens to be a
great logician) and her daughter, Jane. Billy is struggling
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on a tough proof. The correct proof consists of the set of
ordered steps {Φ1...Φn}, where each Φ says something like
“Theorem X, justified by rule of inference Y,” in such a
way that produces a correct proof of Φn. He is stuck on
step Φn-1, and doesn't know what to do next. His Aunt
Ruth, unbeknownst to him, is watching as he attempts to
solve the problem. She knows step Φn-1, and knows that it
is the last step before the conclusion in Billy's proof. She
wants to help him, so she tells her daughter Jane Φn-1, and
then instructs her to inform Billy of it. Jane can remember
the exact wording of Φn-1, but she does not understand
formal logic. Thus, she has no knowledge or belief that Φn
-1. She goes over to Billy, and then testifies that Φn-1. Billy
then knows and believes that Φn -1 is the case based on
Jane's testimony, as Jane is generally truthful to the extent
of Billy's knowledge. However, the source of the
knowledge/belief/warrant is actually his Aunt Ruth.

This example is a demonstration of how knowledge/belief/
warrant can be transmitted even when an agent in the testimonial chain does not believe or know the relevant proposition. One
may again object that knowledge/belief cannot be transmitted
through testimonial chain gaps, but it is far less implausible that
warrant is transmitted; for Aunt Ruth and Billy this justification
is doxastic and propositional, while for Jane it is merely propositional. Regardless, it is still transmitted. Perhaps an altered TVN
can better illustrate this feature of testimony:
TVN*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that
p is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testimony that p only if A's testimony connects B to someone
whose belief is warranted (justified, known).
This allows for Aunt Ruth to be the source of warrant/belief/
knowledge in a testimonial chain. It also allows for “direct” person-to-person transmission of warrant/belief/knowledge (for
example, if the teacher actually believed and knew the theory of
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evolution).
Lackey's “unreliable seer” also fails to be a convincing counterexample to TVN. I agree that one can gain knowledge from
the unreliable seer in this case. But I do not believe that said
knowledge is based on the unreliable seer's testimony. This
counterexample can be seen in a different light, where the unreliable seer's friend gains knowledge because of the seer's reliability, and not her testimony.12 He is basically using his knowledge
of the seer's reliability in the relevant domain to justify his own
belief, which just so happens to be a true one.13 This is a reductive model, as the seer's friend is using her as a non-agential
mechanism that is highly reliable,14 where her reliability is
known. This allows for true belief, justified using induction. For
this counterexample to be effective against TV, the knowledge
the seer's friend receives must be testimonial.15 Lackey thinks it
is, as she writes that the seer “imparts knowledge she does not
have.”16 However, a TV theorist would not think that this example is one where knowledge/belief is transmitted, because the
seer has no knowledge/belief to transmit. Basically, the seer is
not “imparting” anything, since she has nothing to impart in the
first place. It is a product of a reliable process, with strong inductive evidence on the part of the hearer that it is reliable.17 Calling
what the speaker knows in this case testimonial knowledge thus
reveals a reductionist understanding of testimony (which is
something Lackey wishes to avoid).
Lackey then argues that TVS is false. She does this again by
using two counterexamples. The first one I will call
“compulsively trusting”: 18
Compulsively Trusting: Suppose that a hearer is compulsively trusting so that she accepts whatever she is told,
regardless of the amount or kind of evidence there is to
the contrary. In such a case, the hearer simply is not a
properly functioning recipient of testimony...she is so
constituted that the knowledge in question cannot be
passed to her, even though she possesses no defeaters.”19
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The second case I will call “almost a liar”:20
Almost a Liar: Suppose that a speaker in fact knows that
there was a raccoon in the park this morning because she
saw one there, but she is such that she would have reported to her hearer that there was such a raccoon even if
there hadn't been one. In such a case, the speaker’s belief
is an instance of knowledge, and yet because she is an unreliable testifier, the belief that the hearer forms on the
basis of her testimony is not an instance of knowledge.”21
Basically, this is a case where a reliable believer may in fact be an
unreliable testifier. I think that these examples clearly show that
TVS is false. In both cases, all three conditions of TVS are satisfied without the hearer acquiring knowledge, belief, or warrant.
However, it has been argued that an “audience condition” could
be placed on TVS in order to rule these cases out.22 Such a condition should make accepting a speaker's testimony a rational
thing to do, as it is obviously not rational to accept the testimony
of the speakers in the counterexamples to TVS. Furthermore, as
Paul Faulkner argues, “the idea that testimony functions to transmit knowledge and justification is consistent with placing an audience condition on the acquisition of testimonial knowledge, and
so consistent with the falsity of the sufficiency claim as stated.”23
Such a condition would alter TVS as follows:
TVS-RATIONAL: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if
(1) A's belief that p is warranted (justified, known), (2) B
comes to believe that p on the basis of the content of A's
testimony that p, (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for
believing that p, and (4) B possesses reasons that make
acceptance of p on the basis of the content of A's testimony
that p rational, then B's belief that p is warranted
(justified, known). While initially appealing, I think that
this definition runs into a few easy counterexamples due
to ambiguity in terms. Many things would make acceptance “rational” while being less than epistemically
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virtuous. For example, suppose that a speaker has a vested practical interest in lying about some state of affairs
(like raccoons being in parks), such that the speaker
would have testified that p had it actually been the case
that not-p. This makes it the rational thing to do. In order
to separate these practical aims from truth seeking ones, a
more specific definition should be given:
TVS*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, if (1) A's belief
that p is warranted (justified, known), (2) B comes to believe that p on the basis of the content of A's testimony
that p, (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing
that p, and (4) B possesses24 positive reasons that indicate
that (i) A is a reliable believer and (ii) testifier, then B's
belief that p is warranted (justified, known).
Together, TVN* and TVS* amount to a new version of the transmission view, namely TV*. This view is not reductionist, as it
does not reduce to other sources of knowledge (induction, perception, etc.). While it may include an “audience clause,” that
does not change the fact that TV* is a view about the identity of
testimony. Basically, the view states that testimony is the transmission of warrant/belief/knowledge from one agent to another;
without this feature, it is not testimony.
The Statement View
After she finishes expounding the falsity of TV, Lackey proceeds to outline SV. SV involves no transmission of belief. For
Lackey, it is speakers that offer statements to hearers, and it is
these statements that bear epistemic properties. The hearer then
forms the corresponding belief on the basis of understanding and
accepting the statement in question.25 A hearer can then acquire a
belief that is warranted/justified/known from a speaker whose
own belief does not have these epistemic properties (such as in
UNRELIABLE SEER). This allows for novel knowledge to be
generated from testimony. This view also shows why a hearer's
belief may fail to be as warranted as a speakers belief (such as in
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COMPULSIVELY TRUSTING or ALMOST A LIAR). Lackey puts
the primary focus on competence of testimony, which is basically
understood in terms of the reliability of the statement. This is her
“speaker condition,” which is found in clause (1) of this definition:
SV: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that p
is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testimony that p only if (1) A's statement that p is reliable or
otherwise truth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p
on the basis of the content of A's statement that p, and
(3) B has no undefeated defeaters for believing that p.26
Clauses (2) and (3) are basically meant to make the view
“complete.”27
This view, Lackey states, is only a minimum of what is necessary
for a complete view of the epistemology of testimony. This view
comes with serious problems. They are illustrated by the problems discussed earlier in this paper, where Lackey's counterexamples did not hold water. When we considered “unreliable
seer” or “creationist teacher,” we saw that in the latter case
knowledge was transmitted. The actual issue in the example lay
in the poor formulation of TVN. In the former case, Lackey's
counterexample did not escape reinterpretation.28 It actually
showed that reliability, along with positive reasons, is an inductive source of knowledge (which is how the seer's friend gained
knowledge). It seems that SV can explain the “unreliable seer”
case, but perhaps at the cost of being a reductive view of testimony. One may argue that there is no “positive reason” clause in
SV, thus precluding it from being truly inductive. But in fact,
Lackey herself suggests such a clause. One might reformulate SV
to include this clause29 as follows:
SV*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B, B's belief that p
is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of A's testimony that p only if (1) A's statement that p is reliable or
otherwise truth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p
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on the basis of the content of A's statement that p, (3) B
has no undefeated defeaters for believing that p, and (4) B
possesses positive reasons that show that A's statement
that p is reliable, then B's belief that p is warranted
(justified, known).
Such a view does not obviously show that testimony is a unique
source of warrant, belief, or knowledge. It is true that reliability
itself is not reducible.30 Thus, SV would not have been reductive.
However, absent an “audience clause,” SV does not make accepting A's statement rational. Adding this clause makes the case
that a hearer must have reasons to think it is reasonable to accept
A's statement (where reasonable is defined as believing the statement to be reliable). This allows for B's evidence to link up to reliable testimony in a satisfying way. The issue is that this way
does not paint a picture of testimony being a unique source of
knowledge, belief, or warrant. It is actually inductive, and thus
reductive.
Is TV* Reductive?
One might look at the formulation of TV*, and wonder if it
could be construed as a reductive account of testimony. I would
argue against this claim, because TV* is not a claim about the creation of warrant, belief, or knowledge. It is merely a claim which
states that testimony is unique in that it transmits knowledge/
belief/warrant from one person to another. TV* basically identifies testimony with this idea, thus making testimonial
knowledge/belief/warrant a unique type of knowledge/belief/
warrant. However, due to the nature of clause (4) in TVS*, it
seems that any instance of testimony in the style of TV* may in
fact be inductive in an internalist sense. After all, hearers must
have reasons that indicate certain things about their source of information. This same issue is what seems to place SV* into the
category of reductionism. I am willing to accept that TV* is reductive for the sake of argument. Conceding this to SV* will still
allow me to prove my final thesis that TV* is a more intelligible
framework for an epistemology of testimony than SV*.
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Reductionism, Transmission, and Statements
I will now show that, even if we assume that TV* is reductive, TV* is still a more favorable view than SV*. However, I will
first discuss reductionism. In “Testimony,” Lackey rejects global
reductionism. This states that “justification of testimony as a
source of belief reduces to the justification of sense perception,
memory, and inductive inference.”31 I agree with Lackey's arguments against this concept. Her first argument states that in order to have non-testimonial positive reasons to think that testimony as a source is reliable, “one would have to be exposed not
only to a wide-ranging sample of reports but also to a wideranging sample of the corresponding facts.”32 It is impossible for
any one person to gather enough evidence to justify testimony as
a source across the board. Lackey also disputes that there is even
a fact of the matter regarding the general reliability of testimony.
Testimony ranges in complexity. For example, suppose you hear
somebody tell you what time it is, and then somebody tell you
about the virtues of their favorite sports team. It seems that there
is no general way that the idea of testimony picks out a “unified
kind.” If testimony is generally reliable it would not make both
of these aforementioned reports reliable. The latter would probably be skewed for its own reasons (pertaining to the speaker's
bias towards his/her sports team). Thus, it is questionable that it
“even makes sense to talk about testimony being a generally reliable source.”33
She then discusses local reductionism, which states that each
“instance of testimony reduces to the justification of instances of
sense perception, memory, and inductive inference."34 It seems
that both TV* and SV* both fall into this latter category of reductionism (again, I am only accepting that TV* is reductive for the
sake of argument). This factor does not disqualify either of these
views from being frameworks for testimonial knowledge.35 So
what is it that makes TV* a better framework than SV*? Examine
again the first clause of SV*: For every speaker, A, and hearer, B,
B's belief that p is warranted (justified, known) on the basis of
A's testimony that p only if (1) A's statement that p is reliable or
otherwise truth-conducive. Herein lies an issue between state-
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ments and reliability. It is not clear that a statement is the sort of
thing that can be reliable. Processes are usually what are described as being reliable or unreliable. In this way, one can describe a person's belief-forming processes or testimony as being
assessable for reliability. They are types of processes. One takes
count of their token “instantiations” (the set of beliefs, or the set
of testimonies) and if there is a high enough truth ratio (of truths
to falsehoods), the process is considered reliable. One cannot
consider a statement to be reliable or unreliable. It is assessable
only as being true or false; it is a token, not a type. Its type would
probably be the testifier's set of past testimonies.36 Thus, SV* collapses into a more obvious form of inductive reasoning. To have
belief/warrant under SV*, a hearer need only believe that a
speaker reliably believes and testifies. For knowledge, the speaker must actually be a reliable believer and testifier. This sort of
reasoning has little to do with the fact that the agent is testifying;
it is induction that is doing most (if not all) of the justificatory
work. Maintaining that a statement is the sort of thing that can be
reliable runs the risk of SV* being unintelligible. TV* does not
suffer from this issue, as it imposes no reliability condition on
token instantiations of process types. Thus, TV* seems to be a
more plausible theory than SV*, whether or not its status as a
“reductive theory” is assumed.
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Notes
1. Suppose someone sings “I have a soprano voice” in a soprano voice. One learns the content of the proposition by way of
perception, and not by way of testimony.
2. Lackey 2011, 73.
3. Non-reductive views of testimony state that testimony is a
basic source of justification, on an “epistemic par with sense
perception, memory, inference, and the like. Given this, nonreductionists maintain that, so long as there are no relevant
undefeated defeaters, hearers can be justified in accepting
what they are told merely on the basis of the testimony of
speakers.” See Lackey 2011, 73.
4. Reductionists about testimony maintain that, “in addition to
the absence of undefeated defeaters, hearers must also possess non-testimonially based positive reasons in order to be justified in accepting the testimony of speakers. These reasons are
typically the result of induction.” See Lackey 2011, 74.
5. Ibid., 83.
6. Lackey 2006, 79.
7. Lackey 2011, 84.
8. Ibid., 84.
9. Ibid., 84.
10. Ibid., 85.
11. Faulkner, 481.
12. Ibid., 482.
13. One may think that the seer's friend is justified solely by virtue of the seer's reliability, without positive reasons supporting a belief that the seer is reliable. However, many have objected to reliability being sufficient for doxastic justification.
In fact, Lackey herself seems to have this doubt. At the end of
her paper, when she lays out the conditions for SV, she states
that “further conditions may be needed for a complete view
of testimonial knowledge, such as the need for positive reasons embraced by reductionists.” See Lackey 2011, 85.
14. In another paper, Lackey presents a case that is basically the
same as “unreliable seer.” It is called “consistent liar;” it is a
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15.
16.
17.

18.

19.
20.

21.
22.
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case where a radically unreliable believe can still be a reliable
testifier. Lackey argues against the objection that the seer/liar
can be viewed as non-agential mechanisms (like odometers,
thermometers, etc.). She bases her argument on the fact that
they are actually agents, and are capable of not testifying
about anything at all. In “unreliable seer,” for example, the
agent can not testify about the badger, or she can just say
something unrelated to the relevant domain of visual experiences. This is true; however it is important to note in these
examples, both agents testify to some proposition they do not
believe. The only reason the hearers in both cases know/
believe is because the speakers are reliable sources of information in the relevant domains. If they were not reliable,
could the hearer be justified at all? See Lackey 2006, 84.
Ibid., 482.
Lackey 2011, 85.
In “consistent liar,” Lackey actually stresses the important of
strong positive reasons for believing the liar's testimony. She
writes that the hearer in “consistent liar” has “acquired excellent inductive evidence for believing [the liar] to be one of the
most trustworthy people to consult on a wide range of topics.” She argues that this high degree of reliability, plus the
hearer's justification in accepting the liar's report, allow for
testimonial knowledge. As I stated before, it is not clear that
this is the case; it seems that a reliable process plus positive
reasons to believe in its reliability are sufficient for justification. See Lackey, 85.
Lackey actually provides a more illustrative counterexample
of the same name in her paper “Learning From Words.”
However, the one I will describe here from “Testimony” will
suffice, as it is basically the same case.
Ibid., 85.
This example is also retold in greater detail in “Learning
From Words.” I will again, however, opt for the version in
“Testimony” for brevity's sake.
Ibid., 85.
Faulkner, 481.
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23. Ibid., 481.
24. By “possesses,” I mean that B believes or knows these reasons.
25. Lackey 2006, 93.
26. Ibid., 96.
27. Ibid., 96.
28. This is important. When one argues against a view solely by
counterexample, the counterexamples should not be open to
multiple interpretations. See Faulkner, 481.
29. See endnote xiii.
30. Faulkner, 481.
31. Lackey 2011, 74.
32. Ibid., 76.
33. Ibid., 77.
34. Ibid., 75.
35. Lackey objects to this. She states that “most agents frequently
require testimonial knowledge from speakers about whom
they know very little.” She argues against local reductionism
by using another counterexample I will call “Chicago case.”
In this case, a hearer arrives in Chicago for the first time. He
receives accurate directions to the Navy Pier from the first
passerby he sees. Lackey argues that this sort of transaction
results in testimonial knowledge, despite the lack of positive
reasons for accepting the passerby's directions. I do not believe that this is knowledge. Take the following case, which I
will call the “Gettierized Chicago Case,” or (GCC). This case
is exactly the same as “the Chicago case,” except all of the
adult passersby are not exactly sure where the Navy Pier is
located (but are confident enough to testify), save the one
that the hearer asks directions from. In GCC, as opposed to
“Chicago case,” one has the intuition that the hearer's
knowledge is not really knowledge, as he could have easily
chosen a non-knower. It is thus epistemic luck. This is the
case because of reasons similar to those that explain why a
subject has no knowledge in the famous “Barn Case.” For example, “it is a widely accepted thesis that subjects who are
unable to discriminate among relevant alternatives in a given
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domain do not possess the knowledge at issue.” (See Lackey,
“Knowledge and Credit” 38) In GCC, it is the case that the
hearer cannot discriminate among the relevant alternatives.
He could have easily asked somebody with no knowledge as
to the location of the Navy Pier. One could say, as Lackey
does, that this creates a high degree of skepticism. However,
the Gettier case is not without its own skeptical issues. If we
were to drive through barn country in the actual (nonGettierized) world, thinking that we are in danger of forming
Gettiered true beliefs about barns seems to posit a high degree of skepticism. But why should GCC effect our view of
the regular case? It is true that the hearer's environment in
“Chicago case” is more epistemically congenial than in Gettiered “Barn Country.” But the reason for this congeniality is
that the hearer's world in “Chicago Case” isn't Gettierized. If
one tweaked a bad barn case so that none of the barns were
fake, one would intuitively grant a person in that world
knowledge (much like in “Chicago case”). The reason the
Gettier “Barn Case” is troubling is because of its modal proximity to the actual world. For this same reason, GCC is troubling for “Chicago case,” because it is a reasonably close possible world. It may even be closer than the bad barn world.
See Lackey 2011, 77.
36. However, the reliability of a particular statement might be
viewed as a brute fact about the statement itself. That is, its
reliability does not have to be evaluated in a frequentist
sense. This is not impossible. However, if this were the case,
the reliability of the statement can have no effect on the justification or the knowledge that p for the speaker. It may increase the speaker's warrant propositionally, but not doxastically., as the hearer would not know anything about the
statement's reliability. This renders clause (4) of SV* problematic, as there is no way to possess the kind of positive reasons
for the reliability of a statement in a non-frequentist sense.
Thus, SV* would be non-reductionist and therefore false (by
Lackey's lights).
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